

<b>Course title:</b> Collective Action and Environmental Management				
<b>Course code:</b> MPE 135		<b>No. of credits:</b> 3	<b>L-T-P:</b> 25-10-7	<b>Learning hours:</b> 42
<b>Pre-requisite course code and title (if any):</b> Microeconomics I, Basic Econometrics				
<b>Department:</b> Department of Policy Studies				
<b>Course coordinator:</b> Dr. Sukanya Das			<b>Course instructor</b> Dr. Sukanya Das	
<b>Contact details:</b> <a href="mailto:sukanya.das@terisas.ac.in">sukanya.das@terisas.ac.in</a>				
<b>Course type:</b> Elective			<b>Course offered in:</b> Semester 4	
<b>Course description</b> This course familiarizes students with the theory and practice of Collective Action and its implication for Environmental Management. It will discuss issues of institutions, property rights, equity and gender (among others) in order to get a flavour of the literature that is evolving in this area. It will also discuss a wide range of Indian case studies and the research methods being used.				
<b>Course objectives</b> 1) To provide students with a thorough grounding in the key concepts of Collective Action. 2) To illustrate how these concepts and standard economic tools can be used to improve environmental management. To be able to apply this knowledge to the analysis of local and global environmental problems.				
<b>Course content</b>				
Module	Topic	L	T	P
1	<b>Logic of Collective Action and Environment</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The origin of debate over collective action</li> <li>• Individual action versus Collective action.</li> <li>• What is collective action problem?</li> <li>• When does collective action fail?</li> <li>• Solving collective action Problem.</li> <li>• Politics of collective action.</li> <li>• Social Capital</li> <li>• Application of Collective Action theory to Environmental Problems. Common Pool Resources (land, forest, irrigation system) Climate change</li> <li>• Waste accumulation</li> </ul>	6	2	
2	<b>Institutions, Collective Action and Environment</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Role of State.</li> <li>• Privatization.</li> <li>• Community Mobilization and Devolution of power.</li> <li>• Social norms and traditional institutions.</li> <li>• Institutional transition.</li> <li>• Case studies on different types of institutions for collective action for environmental problems.</li> </ul>	11	5	5
3	<b>Distribution of Wealth, Collective Action and Environment</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poverty and Inequality</li> <li>• Heterogeneity</li> <li>• Gender issues</li> <li>• Geography</li> </ul>	8	3	2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>7</b>

**Evaluation criteria:**

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| ▪ Minor 1 [end of module 1]                            | 25% |
| ▪ Class presentation and discussions [end of module 2] | 25% |
| ▪ Major Exam [end of all modules]                      | 50% |

**Learning outcomes:**

1. Understand theory of collective action models [ all evaluation criteria]
2. Analyse collective action problems and issues pertaining to environment and incorporate evidenced based solutions. [ class presentation and discussions]

**Pedagogical Approach :** class interaction, teaching and discussion, group assignment, case studies presentation

**Course Reading Material (\*= compulsory readings)****Module 1****Logic of Collective Action and Environment**

1. \*Hardin, R. (1982). *Collective action*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
2. \*Mancur Olson (1965) *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
3. \*Elinor Ostrom (1990) *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*, Cambridge: CUP
4. \*William Ferguson (2013) *Collective Action and Exchange: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Contemporary Political Economy*.
5. \*Dennis Chong (1991) *Collective action and the Civil Right Movements*.
6. \*Sethi, Rajiv, and E. Somanathan. "A simple model of collective action." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 54.3 (2006): 725-747.
7. \*Sobel, Joel. "Can we trust social capital?" *Journal of economic literature* (2002): 139-154.
8. \*P. Dasgupta and I. Serageldin, eds., (2000) *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective* (Washington, DC: World Bank).
9. \*Fukuyama, F. (1997) *Social Capital*, Oxford: OUP
10. \*Cole, D. H. (2008). Climate change and collective action. *Current Legal Problems*, 61(1), 229-264.
11. \*Agarwal, Bina. "Conceptualising Environmental Collective Action: Why Gender Matters." *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 24 (2000): 283-310.

**Module 2****Institutions, Collective Action and Environment**

1. \*Elinor Ostrom (1990) *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*, Cambridge: CUP
2. \*Elinor Ostrom, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak, Paul C. Stern, Susan Stonich, and Elke U. Weber, Ed. (2002), *The Drama of the Commons*, Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change, National Research Council, Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
3. \*Arun Agrawal, [Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources](#), *World Development*, 29(10): 1649-72
4. \*Jean-Marie Baland and Jean-Phillipe Platteau (2000) *Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is there a Role for Rural Communities?* OUP.
5. \*Wade, R. (1994), *Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India*, San Francisco, CA: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.
6. \*Ghate, Rucha, Jodha, Narpat, Mukhopadhyay, Pranab (Editors), 2008, *Promise, Trust and Evolution: Managing the Commons of South Asia*.
7. \*Ostrom, Elinor. "Collective action and the evolution of social norms." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* (2000): 137-158.
8. \*Sethi, Rajiv, and Eswaran Somanathan. "The evolution of social norms in common property resource use." *The American Economic Review* (1996): 766-788.
9. \*Agrawal, Arun, and Elinor Ostrom. "Collective action, property rights, and decentralization in resource use in India and Nepal." *Politics & Society* 29.4 (2001): 485-514.
10. \*Yau, Yung. "Domestic waste recycling, collective action and economic incentive: The case in Hong Kong." *Waste management* 30.12 (2010): 2440-2447.
11. \*Lubell, Mark, Mark Schneider, John T. Scholz, and Mihriye Mete. "Watershed Partnerships and the Emergence of Collective Action Institutions." *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 1 (2002): 148-163.

**Module 3****Distribution of Wealth, Collective Action and Environment**

1. \*Jean-Marie Baland, Pranab Bardhan & Samuel Bowles Eds., (2007), *Inequality, Cooperation, and Environmental Sustainability*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
2. \*Pranab Bardhan, Maitreesh Ghatak, Alexander Karaivanov, Wealth inequality and collective action, *Journal of Public Economics*, Volume 91(9).
3. \*Starrett, D. (1976), "Social Institutions, Imperfect Information, and the Distribution of Income", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 90, 261-84.
4. \*Collective Action for Forest Conservation: Does Heterogeneity Matter? E. Somanathan, R. Prabhakar and B.S. Mehta, pp. 234-245 in *Inequality, Cooperation, and Environmental Sustainability* edited by Jean-Marie Baland, Pranab Bardhan and Samuel Bowles, Princeton University Press, November 2006.

**Useful websites**

<http://www.collective-action.info/>

[http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2009/ostrom-lecture.html](http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2009/ostrom-lecture.html)

<http://serc.carleton.edu/introgeo/games/examples/62222.html>

**Additional information (if any):**

**Student responsibilities:** Attendance, feedback, discipline: as per university rules.

**Course reviewers:**

The course is reviewed and commented by the following experts

Professor E. Somanathan, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Dr N S Jodha, ICIMOD, Nepal